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adequate representation. In the majority of cases the erring lawyer
is reputable and professionally competent; he has merely committed
error that made him ineffective in the disputed case. It would seem
obvious that disciplinary action is warranted only if the performance of the attorney is such that it reflects on the integrity of
the profession. Assuming that decisions in recent years are indicative of the trend, courts will become more objective and more demanding as to the quality of representation required by the Constitution. The organized bar should begin now to take steps that will
aid the courts in formulating an adequate and workable standard.
The efforts of the bar have been highly successful in solving problems for providing counsel to indigent defendants. It can be assumed that they will be successful in devising objective standards
in evaluating the defense rendered in a given case.
DAviD S. ORCUTT

Constitutional Law-Religious Segregation of Public Schools-The
Wearing of Distinctive Religious Garb by Public School Teachers
While Teaching
In Moore v. Board of Educ.1 a parent-taxpayer sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendant school board's method
of operating three of the schools in the district violated the first
amendment and Ohio constitutional prohibitions2 against the establishment of religion. Also, a declaratory judgment was sought
against the placement plan, the effect of which was to create three
schools totally Catholic and one predominantly non-Catholic, on the
ground that it was a denial of equal protection of the law under the
fourteenth amendment as applied in Brown v. Board of Educ.3
Prayer for an injunction to prohibit these practices was joined with
the request for declaratory relief. The plaintiff further sought an
injunction against the, wearing of religious garb by nuns while
teaching in public schools on the ground that it introduced sectarianism into the schools.
The court held that there was a governmental establishment of
religion and issued an injunction accordingly, stating that the total
effect of all of defendant's practices was to use public school funds
'4 Ohio Misc. 257, 212 N.E.2d 833 (C.P. 1965).
2OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 7. See note 23 infra.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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for the operation of parochial schools. 4 The court, however, did
not grant injunctive relief against the religious segregation effectuated by the placement plan, holding that Brown v. Board of Educ.
was not applicable." The court also refused to enjoin the practice
of wearing religious garb by public school teachers while teaching,
stating that such practice did not convert the school where they
taught into a sectarian institution."
The court is no doubt correct in its determination that there
had been an establishment of religion. Taking into consideration
the total effect of the defendant's released time program and other
practices, no other result could have been reached on this issue.'
It is felt that the court adequately discussed this aspect of the case
in its opinion; consequently, it will not be further considered in
this note.
In determining that Brown v. Board of Educ.' was not applicable, the court found lack of evidence that religious segregation
adversely affected the students' motivation to learn or that the student in the segregated school received educational opportunities substantially inferior to those of the nonsegregated school. It will be
recalled that the court in Brown reacted to a large volume of evidence showing the psychological, sociological, and economic impact
that racially segregated schools have on the Negro child. Similar
evidence might have been introduced in the principal case.9 But even
'4 Ohio Misc. at 271-77, 212 N.E.2d at 842-45.

Id. at 268-69, 212 N.E.2d at 83940.
d. at 269-71, 212 N.E.2d at 840-41.
"These practices included (1) providing a released-time religious program one hour per day, five days per week, with religious instruction given
by the classroom teachers at a Catholic church nearby; (2) determination
of attendance at the several schools on basis of religion rather than geography, supposedly under a parental choice plan; (3) allowing pupils from
outside the district to attend such schools with tuition paid by their parish;
and (4) renting from the Roman Catholic Church for ninety-nine years at a
rental of one dollar per year the properties upon which three of the schools
were constructed. Id. at 268-77, 212 N.E.2d at 839-45.
R347 U.S. 483 (1954).
, The usual makeup of the Catholic parochial school encompasses students
from all ethnic and cultural backgrounds. FICHTER, PAROCHIAL SCHOOL:
A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 451 (1958). Therefore, it could be reasoned that
religious segregation is not detrimental to the students' education. However,
parochial schools have been criticized as contributing to a divisiveness in
America and promoting religious bigotry. If so, they may be considered to
have adverse effects upon the students. See McCLUSKEY, CATHOLIC VIEWPOINT ON EDUCATION 36-38 (1959). See also Thomas, Voluntary Religious
Isolation--Another School Segregation Story, 40 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 347
(1959).
8
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without such evidence, it is submitted that Brown should apply.
Brown, in its broader meaning, seems to stand for the proposition
that the Constitution does not permit artificial classifications by the
state whether they be made on the basis of race, color, status, or
religion. These factors are said to be constitutionally irrelevant;1O
consequently, any classification founded upon them should be a violation of equal protection of the laws. 1
Congress categorized these classifications as unlawful in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 It would seem that the practices of the
defendant school board violate this act." The act defines desegregation as the assignment of students to public schools "without
regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin.
The statute has no provision requiring any proof of equal or unequal facilities or that the students' motivation to learn has been
impaired in any way. The inference seems to be that the classification itself is a violation of equal protection. Assuming the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the act, the Moore court
should have taken cognizance of them and stricken down the placement plan.
The religious garb question turns on the legality of the religious
segregation. If the garbed teacher instructs only those of his own
religion, as in Moore, then the objections to the garb would seem
to have little merit.' 5 But since the religious segregation would
(Jackson, J., con10 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941)
curring).
" Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. Rzv. 341, 353 (1941). A case very similar to Moore on its facts is
Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942). There the Missouri
Supreme Court found religious segregation of public schools to be a violation of complete religious freedom and did not consider the equal protection
argument. The court did, however, recognize the unconstitutionality of the
religious classification. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). "[I]f this statute of Louisiana [requiring
racial segregation] is consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why
may not the state require the separation ... of Protestantsand Roman Catholics?" (Emphasis added.) Justice Harlan's dissent is essentially the view
espoused by the Supreme Court today. The present Court, if faced with religious segregation, would probably answer his rhetorical question in the
negative.
1278 Stat. 240, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
1878 Stat. 248, 42 U.S.C. 2000c-6(a) (1), (2) (1964).
14 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
" But see Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942), indicating that religious garb and insignia are impermissible in the school even
when the garbed teacher and his pupils are of the same faith.
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seem to be unconstitutional, the garb question will here be treated
as though the classroom were religiously integrated.
The court followed what it stated to be the majority rule: the
wearing of religious garb by public school teachers while teaching
cannot be prevented in absence of a statute or regulation expressly
prohibiting it.'" The religious garb question seems to place two
highly regarded constitutional provisions-the guarantee of free exercise of religion and the prohibition against governmental establishment of religion-in opposition to each other." If a teacher is dismissed because of his religious dress, such dismissal would seem
tantamount to denying him free exercise of his religious beliefs.
However, to allow the teacher to wear his religious habit in the
public school could be to favor one religion over others and thus
to "establish" the favored religion.'"
The leading case for the majority view is Hysong v. Gallitzin
Bourough School Dist."a There it was held that to deny teachers
4 Ohio Misc. at 469-70, 212 N.E.2d at 841. Quaere: If the teacher
has a constitutionally protected right to teach while wearing the garb, would
not a statute or regulation prohibiting it be unconstitutional?
"Both provisions are set out in U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .

. . ."

These provisions are made applicable upon the

states through U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943). All states have somewhat similar provisions.
See PFEFFER & BAUM, MEMORANDUM ON DISPLAY OF CROSSES, CRUCIFIXES,
2 (1957).
"8See notes 20-23 infra and accompanying text. "It is only necessary
that the practice or enactment have the net effect of placing the official
support of the local or national government behind a particular denominaCRECHES, AND OTHER RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS ON PUBLIC PROPERTY

tion or belief." Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 53 (W.D. Mich.
1965). (The emphasis is that of the court.)
" 164 Pa. 629, 30 At. 482 (1894). It is to be noted that Hysong
represents the majority in absence of statute or regulation. Several jurisdictions have prohibited the practice by statute or regulation, and the trend
seems to be moving in this direction. BUTTS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION
IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION 197-99 (1950). See NEB. REV. STAT. § 791274 (1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-29 (1959); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
342.650-.655 (Supp. 1965), applied in 1926-28 ORE. Ops. ATrry GEN. 237.
But see WIs. STAT. ANN. § 40.435 (1957), which seems to indicate that
garbed nuns can be hired as public school teachers. This statute is discussed
by Boyer, Religious Education of Public School Pupils in Wisconsin, 1953
WIs. L. REV. 181, 214.
Even the Hysong case was overturned by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §

11-1112 (1962), which was upheld in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132,
78 Atl. 68 (1910). Adhering to the Hysong rule are City of New Haven v.

Town of Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 43 A.2d 455 (1945); State ex rel.
Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256 (1940); Rawlings v. Butler,
290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956); Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 267 N.W.
127 (1936).

RELIGIOUS SEGREGATION

1966]

1093
9

employment because of their distinctive religious dress would be to
impose a high penalty upon one for a particular religious belief.
The dissent felt that such teachers could be excluded in that "the
common schools cannot be used to exalt any given church or
sect ....,2O The leading case for the minority is Knowlton v. Baumhover,21 which expressly adopted the dissenting opinion in Hysong.
The Baumhover principle was later more explicitly set forth in
Zellers v. Huff.2 2 This court said that
the wearing of religious garb and religious insignia must be
henceforth barred, during the time the Religious are on duty as
public school teachers. .

.

. Not only does the wearing of re-

ligious garb and insignia have a propagandizing effect for the
Church, but by its very nature it introduced sectarian religion
23
into the school.
North Carolina has no case, statutory, or administrative law relative to
religious garb in public schools. Public school authorities in North Carolina could apparently regulate the dress of teachers by analogy to a recent
North Carolina Attorney General's opinion that school authorities could
require students to conform to "a sensible personal appearance" or face
expulsion. Greensboro Daily News, Sept. 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
164 Pa. at 661, 30 Atl. at 485.
182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918).
2255

N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951).

Id. at 525, 236 P.2d at 964. (Emphasis added.) Huff should have
been strong authority for the Moore court in that the applicable sections
of the constitutions of Ohio and New Mexico are nearly identical. Huff
was based in part upon N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 11, forbidding that any
"preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of
worship." OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 7, provides that "no preference shall be
given, by law, to any religious society .....

The Huff court relied extensively upon O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y.
421, 77 N.E. 612 (1906), that upheld an administrative regulation prohibiting the wearing of religious garb by public school teachers while teaching. The court in O'Conmor said:
[T]he effect of the costume worn by these sisters of St. Joseph at all
times in the presence of their pupils would be to inspire respect if not
sympathy for the religious denomination to which they so manifestly
belong.
Id. at 428, 77 N.E. at 614 (1906).
See also Outcalt v. Hoefler, (unreported), Logan County Dist. Court,
Colo. (Aug. 1952), cited in Boyer, supra note 19, at 227 n.156; Harfst v.
Hoegan, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942); State ex tel. Pub. School
Dist. v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573 (1932).
See generally

BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

157-59 (1963);
84-85 (1962);

DIERENFIELD, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 412-27 (1953);
TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 258-60 (1948). For a

close look at the church-state problems of Kentucky in education, see COLLIER, EDUCATION,

(1960).

RELIGION,

AND

THE KENTUCKY

COURT

or

APPEALS
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There is merit to the Baumhover-Huff doctrine. The Moore
court, while indicating that the dress of the sisters did denote their
membership in a religious sect, felt that the garb itself did not teach
and that it merely represented "modesty, unworldliness, and an unselfish life."'24 It is true that the garb does not "teach" in the
traditional sense. Even courts adhering to the Hysong doctrine
would not allow the oral interjection of religious dogma into the
classroom by the teacher.2 5 Yet speech is only one form of communication. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett20 the
Supreme Court observed that "symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas." 27 Going further, the Court said
"the Church speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and
shrine, and clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious symbols come to convey theological
28
ones."
The establishment clause is said to require a complete wall of
separation between church and state, thus compelling governmental
neutrality in regard to religion.2 9 It would seem difficult to maintain this neutrality if public school teachers are allowed to bring
their religion into the classroom by way of their religious habit.
The school is second only to the family in the development of the
child's personality, and the teacher plays an important role in the
influence of the school."0 Children seem to identify with the teacher
and to take on his characteristics. 31 The result could be an inclina"'4 Ohio Misc. at 270, 212 N.E.2d at 841.
"2See, e.g., Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Ky. 1956). It is

difficult to believe that a nun could teach without openly interjecting her
religion into the classroom. See CUSHING, THE MISSION OF THE TEACHER
(1962).
( 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
'78 1d. at 632.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
"There is no Constitutional language per se calling for "a wall of
separation." This phrase was first used by Jefferson years after the adoption of the first amendment. He declared its purpose was to create a wall
of separation. See Comment, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 73, 82 n.66 (1963). The

courts have quoted him extensively. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962); Illinois e-- rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
"

BAUGHMAN & WELSH, PERSONALITY:

(1962). See also

A

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE

226-35

BERENDA, THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP ON THE JUDG-

MENTS OF CHILDREN (1950).
'1 Amatora, Similarity in

Teacher and Pupil Personality, 37 J. oF
45 (1954). Cf. POUNDS & BRYNER, THE SCHOOL IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 271 (1959).
It seems that the younger the child is, the greater
influence the teacher has upon him. See BERENDA, op. cit. supra note 30.
PSYCHOLOGY
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tion to favor the religion of the teacher, especially if the teacher
constantly keeps his or her religion before the child by means of
symbolic dress.
This problem could take on added complexity if the student
were of agnostic parentage or if the parents were adamantly opposed to the religion represented by the teacher. A somewhat
parallel situation was presented in Abington School Dist. v.
Schemp. 2 There the Supreme Court was in part concerned about
the well-being of the nonbelieving students who were subjected to
Bible reading as authorized by a state statute.3" The Court indicated
that the child who sought exemption from the Bible readings would
be treated as an "odd ball" and would be under peer group pressure
to conform to the beliefs of the majority. 4 Ohio has an education
statute requiring mandatory school attendance that in a sense creates
a captive audience for the teacher. 5 If the nonbelieving student
could be psychologically impaired by pressures resulting from the
daily recitation of the Bible, could not the conflicting pressures from
the home, from the group, and from the teacher clothed in religious
paraphenalia have at least an equal effect upon the student?
Apparently there has been no federal litigation regarding the
wearing of religious garb by public school teachers while teaching. 36
If such litigation should occur, it is hoped that the Supreme Court
would follow its present trend requiring a complete separation of
church and state and adopt the minority rule, barring the wearing
of religious garb. Such rule would avoid favoritism of any religion
and could also alleviate any possible harmful effects to the students.
Tommy W. JARRETT
The Missouri Supreme Court in Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist., 364
Mo. 121, 132, 260 S.W.2d 573, 578 (1953) (per curiam), said "children
of grade school age are under-developed and are particularly susceptible to
the influence of their teachers and surroundings and the actions of the
children with whom they are associated."
82374 U.S. 203 (1963). See Hanft, The Prayer Decisions, 42 N.C.L.
REv. 567 (1962).

"8 PA.

STAT. ANN. tit.

24, § 15-1516 (1962).

"374 U.S. at 289-91 nn. 68 & 69.
OirIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3321.03-.04 (Supp. 1965).
"The only time this problem has ever been encountered within the
federal government was by virtue of a regulation promulgated by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1912. This regulation prohibited the wearing
of religious insignia and garb by teachers employed in the Indian schools.
A public controversy ensued, and President Taft permanently revoked the
regulation.

See

119-22 (1948).
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